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It would be an act of honesty to rename prison institutions as houses for the 
poor. The renaming would describe in a nutshell recent developments in 
penality and incarceration in several European countries, in those where 
growing punitive harshness is found as well as those apparently displaying no 
visible growing punitiveness. A proviso, however, should be borne in mind: 
while the old houses for the poor, established during the course of the eighteenth 
century in England and Wales, hosted working paupers from whom many 
parishes expected to earn money, those ‘housed’ in European institutions today 
are officially regarded, and by many perceived, as largely unprofitable. One 
similarity, however, remains between the old and the new houses: they are both 
the result of philosophies regarding ‘poor relief’ as a distortion of market 
freedom. Malthus’ complaint that the Poor Laws interfered with the natural laws 
of supply and demand finds echoes in contemporary advocates of austerity for 
the disadvantaged and prosperity for those already prospering.  
   This chapter provides sketches of the use of imprisonment in different 
continental European countries, identifying the groups which are mainly 
targeted by penal measures. These are followed by an analysis of the manifest 
and latent functions of punishment in the countries considered. The countries 




Scandinavian countries are usually held as examples of parsimony in the use of 
incarceration. However, in Finland, Norway and particularly in Sweden the 
number of prisoners rose significantly since the 1970s. The increase in Sweden 
was particularly significant around the turn of the new millennium, although 
fines still constitute the major penal sanction in the country (von Hofer and 
Tham, 2013). Rates of imprisonment in this area of Europe are associated with 
public concerns around violent crime, drug trafficking and illegal migration, but 
penal moderation and humane prison conditions remain characteristics of the 
region (Pratt and Erickson, 2012). Scandinavian ‘exceptionalism’ is said to 
emerge from the culture of equality prevalent in these countries which is 
embedded in their social fabrics through the universalism of the welfare state 
(Pratt, 2008). Beyond cultural explanations, however, moderate social inequality 
has also been indicated as a crucial factor making Scandinavian countries less 
inclined to adopt the increasing punitiveness characterizing late modern 
societies (Barry and Leonardsen, 2012). Successful rehabilitation programmes 
are singled out as key tools for reducing recidivism and hampering criminal 
careers. Academic and vocational programmes carried out in Swedish prisons, 
for example, are deemed successful, as are the provisions of the 1994 Prison 
Treatment Act, which established the need for prisoners to be offered a suitable 
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job. Such practices are seen as positive foundations for the offenders’ new lives 
leading to successful re-integration back into society (Pettit and Kroth, 2011). 
   Finland is particularly significant for the long-term decline in prison numbers 
experienced after the 1990s, while Sweden and Norway show a ‘slow creep’ in 
incarceration rates particularly relating to foreign nationals (Lappi-Seppala, 
2012; Dullum and Ugelvik, 2012; Scott, 2013). Critics, however, argue that low 
incarceration rates, like those observed in Scandinavian countries, do not say 
much about prison conditions, for example, they do not account for the high 
numbers of self-inflicted deaths which are relatively high in the institutions of 
these countries. Moreover, as Mathiesen (2012) has remarked, they do not 
illustrate the pain of detention as it is experienced by prisoners. In Sweden, 
finally, prison is increasingly becoming the quickest way of dealing with truly 
poor citizens, or even with non-citizens, namely migrants devoid of political 
power and representation. As von Hofer and Tham (2013: 52) observe: ‘These 
often impoverished people have nothing of value to offer in the trade: neither in 
the form of economic or social capital, nor even in the sense of any meaningful 
form of electoral support. Thus, the criminal of today’s Sweden has become a 
true public enemy’. 
   Research conducted in Scandinavian new generation prisons found that 
minimum security and open institutions induce their own specific pains of 
captivity. Inmates living in self-managed cottages and enjoying relative freedom 
of movement are reported to experience ‘prisonization’ symptoms similar to 
those characterizing inmates in closed institution: disorientation, anxiety, mental 
tiredness and fear (Shammas, 2014). Nordic penal regimes are also sees as 
Janus-faced, with one side relatively mild and benign and the other intrusive and 
oppressive. This duality is associated to the similarly dual nature of the welfare 
state, which simultaneously promotes individual well-being while authorizing 
disciplinary measures and even violations of basic rights. In Sweden, the welfare 
state is, on the one hand, universalistic and egalitarian and, on the other, 
exclusionary and essentialist. ‘The lack of individual rights and an ethno-cultural 
conception of citizenship make certain categories of people such as criminal 
offenders, criminal aliens, drug offenders and perceived “others”, particularly 
foreign nationals, vulnerable to deprivation and exclusion’ (Barker, 2012: 5). 
   Sweden has been the subject of several reports by the council of Europe 
describing it as a harsher society than people think: ‘Swedish law, society and 
morality can be surprisingly authoritarian’ (Neroth, 2014: 1). Prison chaplain 
Birgitta Winberg, who is president of the International Prison Chaplains’ 
Association, also thinks that ‘the world has a rosy view of the country’ (ibid). She 
described Swedish remand prisons as the worst in the world, with people kept in 
isolation before being charged, restricted in their cells for 23 hours a day. In a 
report published in December 2009, the Council of Europe (2009) wrote that 
despite an ‘ongoing dialogue’ about remand conditions, Sweden had done little 
since previous visits and concerns remained valid. The report said its delegates 
talked to remand prisoners and that the overwhelming majority had been given 
no explanation for the restrictions imposed on them. Many considered that the 
only reason why they were being prohibited contact with their family members 
was to ‘break’ them. The health of the accused was found to be severely strained. 
The report said that many prisoners suffered a lack of concentration, memory 
disturbance, impaired communication skills, as well as various physical 
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infirmities. Finally: ‘Symptoms of anxiety disorder are commonly seen, post-
traumatic stress disorder and depression can develop, and also agitation and 
self-harm’ (ibid: 34). 
   Exceptionalism was tragically tested during the summer 2011, when seven 
people were killed by a bomb placed in the centre of Oslo and 69 at a youth camp 
run by the Labour Party. ‘The offender was not an immigrant. He was a tall, 
blond man. He was a very Norwegian-minded Norwegian’ (Christie, 2011: 1). In 
Nils Christie’s comment, the initial reaction to the atrocity was not inspired by 
revenge but by an appeal to democratic principles guiding the Norwegian 
society. The Mayor of Oslo promised that the killer would be punished not 
through a suspension of democracy but an intensification of its ideals of 
tolerance. Some weeks after the massacre, at the municipal elections, the Mayor 
of Oslo was reelected with an extraordinary large margin. Changing the 




When ‘contrasting tolerance’ in the UK and the Netherlands, the positive aspects 
of the penal system in the latter country were, in the past, regularly highlighted. 
Downes (1988) observed better inmate-staff relationships, more lenient 
regimes, leaner complaint procedures available to prisoners, who also enjoyed 
the ‘one person per cell’ right. In the Netherlands, alternatives to custody were 
introduced in the early 1970s and included activities benefiting the public, which 
were to become more precise forms of community service by the turn of the 
decade. The probation service supervising the alternative treatment of offenders 
was strengthened, but was slowly removed from the social work arena into the 
sphere of the Ministry of Justice (van Swaaningen, 2000). Later, alternatives such 
as community service orders, educational schemes and electronic monitoring 
‘became integral parts of the penal system and were reshaped in accordance 
with the expansionist discourse’ (Boone and van Swaaningen, 2013: 17).  
   Between the 1980s and the 1990s, the Netherlands experienced a decline in 
rehabilitation philosophies and a correspondent growth of the notion of 
punishment as a measure of social defense (van Swaaningen and de Jonge, 
1995). How the new punitive philosophy came about is hard to ascertain, 
although justification for the shift revolves around two readily available 
variables: public pressure and rising criminality (Boone and Moerings, 2007). 
Imprisonment rates went down since 2005, and then up again after a few years, 
but fluctuations are explained through structural changes in law enforcement, 
inconstant sentencing policies and new rules for the classification of convicted 
offenders. The punitive shift has, however, accelerated: non-custodial sentences 
are no longer intended as lenient alternatives, but as effective forms of social 
protection, while public discourse on penal issues is increasingly informed by 
electoral aims. This has resulted in plans for the restructuring of sentencing, with 
proposals to introduce minimum penalties for every single offence and to 
exclude specific offenders from the benefits of non-custodial treatment. 
Campaigns on crime and insecurity tend to embrace any sort of antisocial 
behavior, particularly relating to street life, and are principally focused on 
immigrants. Public debate on crime control, in brief, is ‘increasingly defined in 
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terms of “us” – the white Dutch – against “them” – the foreigners who make our 
society increasingly unpleasant’ (Boone and van Swaaningen, 2013: 11).  
   The Dutch rehabilitative stance, if attenuated, has not totally vanished, as 
proven by the persistence of programmes designed for prisoners returning to 
the free world and the prevalent use of non-custodial measures for those served 
with short sentences. Rehabilitation as a general principle, however, seems to be 
addressed to those who already show signs of social reintegration (white minor 
offenders), while it is ruled out for those who would genuinely benefit from it 
(excluded minorities). ‘The Dutch attitude, once interpreted as tolerance, has 
now turned into indifference towards those people who do not belong to us’ 
(ibid: 29).  
   The German criminal justice system was widely criticized during the 1970s for 
its severity in dealing with political dissent and the actual (and perceived) threat 
of armed struggle. The special legislation introduced in those years included 
longer remand periods and solitary confinement for those charged with political 
violence. It also entailed a widening of power for the police who could cordon off 
and raid entire urban areas and hold suspects for days without pressing charges 
(Messner and Ruggiero, 1995). By the late 1980s, however, the country managed 
to reduce the overall size of the prison population, as well as improve conditions 
in custody. During the course of the 1990s the pendulum swung back again, with 
the prison population rising, fuelled by public anxiety in the aftermath of 
unification, but also by the perceived threats of immigration and drug related 
crime. It should be noted that the rise took place in the remand population rather 
than in the prison population as a whole, signaling an attempt by authorities to 
reassure the public by inflicting some sort of preventive punishment. Fear of 
crime, therefore was associated with foreigners, young people and drug users, 
their visibility and poverty being perceived as precursors of illegal behavior. 
   In the new millennium processes of differential criminalization became more 
pronounced. Offences reported to the police and police investigations 
increasingly fell in the domain of illegal conduct typically imputed to 
marginalized groups. Non-German nationals are over-represented in the prison 
population (25 per cent), serve comparatively longer sentences and are given 
fewer non-custodial alternatives. 
   Fines replace prison sentences of up to three months, and their decline is due 
to the deterioration of economic conditions and failure to pay. Community 
service is, therefore, more frequently applied to disadvantaged offenders. 
Probation is available, as is the suspension of a sentence after two thirds of the 
period has been served, and electronic monitoring was introduced in 2011. ‘In 
brief, probation and conditional sentences make up the bulk of penal measures, 
while imprisonment, though remaining a crucial form of punishment, is 
decreasing’ (Dollinger and Kretschmann, 2013: 143). Despite regional 
differences, there is no empirical evidence of a general trend towards growing 
punitiveness in Germany. Punitive tendencies mainly affect particularly 
stigmatized offenders or particularly vulnerable groups. These are differentially 
treated throughout the criminal justice process, from public reporting to police 
investigation, during the judicial phase and, ultimately, at the sentencing stage. 
The core target of the criminal justice apparatus as a whole is, therefore ‘a small 
group of serious criminals who are seen as highly dangerous and at high risk of 
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recidivism’ (ibid: 150), on the one hand, and traditionally marginalized groups 
who are deemed incapable to conform, on the other.  
    The French penal system is said to oscillate between a secular, ‘scientific’ 
model born with the Enlightenment and a religious, confessional model aimed at 
the redemption of offenders (Perrot, 1980; Gallo, 1995). Only during the 1960s 
did an ‘obsession’ with prison security develop, resulting in the identification of a 
new category of prisoners deemed particularly difficult. The regime imposed on 
these prisoners ‘provided the blueprint for what were eventually to become high 
security prison institutions’ (Gallo, 1995: 74). The definition of dangerousness 
was applied to professional criminals or those prisoners who challenged the 
prison regime. Differential treatment followed, whereby inmates were classified 
on the grounds of their attitude towards the institution. The second half of the 
1970s was characterized by a period of reform, with more alternatives to 
custody being introduced and wider supervisory powers given to the judiciary 
on issues such as prison treatment and rehabilitation. Many crime prevention 
projects carried out at the local level in the first half of the 1980s (de Liège, 
1991) led to a marked decline in the prison population, while the second half of 
the same decade saw the most ambitious programme to fight crime: the building 
of new prisons and the expansion of their total capacity. 
   Over the last three decades or so, the use of imprisonment as a penal measure 
has remained relatively stable, constituting approximately twenty per cent of all 
sentences. While fines tend to decline, community service orders observe an 
ascending trend. Although relative to the use of other sanctions, recourse to 
prison sentences has hardly increased, ‘it has increased significantly in terms of 
the absolute number of people imprisoned’ (Robert, 2013: 112). This, 
accompanied by an increase in the length of sentences handed down and new 
legislation restricting judicial discretion by mandating minimum sentences for 
recidivists, led to chronic prison overcrowding. During the first decade of the 
millennium, successive electoral campaigns were fought in the name of security 
and played to xenophobic and punitive sentiments, producing a very large 
number of new criminal laws. 
   The major shift in the composition of prisoners in France regards the 
percentage of non-French born: well over thirty per cent. The shift, which started 
in the early 1990s is due less to the prevalence of conventional offenders among 
non-nationals than to the stricter regulations introduced in the country with 
respect to work permits and permits to stay. Non-nationals, therefore, are 
‘administrative’ offenders, sans-papiers who keep negotiating and fighting for 
their presence in France (Ruggiero, 2001). Increased powers accorded to law 
enforcement agencies to carry out identity checks and changes in legislation 
encouraging the targeting of people with foreign physiognomy were important 




The prison system in Bulgaria is formed of old correctional facilities, most of 
which were built during the 1930s. The newest institution was constructed in 
1962 and only in 2010 did the government identify an area around Sofia were a 
new facility with a 2,000 capacity is expected to be built. Bulgarian institutions 
detain between 8-9,000 prisoners, and the available space per person measures 
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around four square metres. Amnesties are used as a tool to temper over-
crowding, although opposition by public opinion has significantly reduced their 
frequency and effectiveness over the last years. The imprisonment rate grew 
significantly at the turn of the current millennium, when a serious economic 
crisis hit the country, but accession to the EU required legal renewal and new 
procedural norms, which resulted in a reduction of custodial sanctions and their 
average duration (Gounev, 2013). Pressure on the country to fight organized 
crime and corruption, in its turn, caused the reversal of the trend, with custodial 
measures ascending again and harsher punishments being meted out. 
   Crime prevention policies and programmes for the re-integration of first-time 
offenders are insufficient and their impact unknown. Probation is used since 
2005 as the main alternative to custody, and community service, which is loosely 
regulated, is also applied by the probation service, staffed mainly by former 
police officers, of whom less than ten per cent have undergone any professional 
training. One additional penal sanction available in Bulgaria consists of 
confiscation of criminal assets. 
   The prison system is characterized by corruption and a variety of criminal 
activities, ranging from the smuggling of prohibited objects to mendacious 
reports about the conduct of prisoners drafted by bribed professionals. The 
banned objects smuggled in include smart phones which allow offenders to carry 
out their illicit activities while serving a sentence, while reports relating to good 
conduct are used to gain regular days of release (Gounev and Bezlov, 2012). 
Drug use in prison is widespread.  
   Research shows a high degree of impunity for organized criminals and corrupt 
officials due to procedural loopholes and, conversely, exorbitant harshness 
inflicted upon socially excluded groups (CSD, 2012). ‘The treatment of Roma 
people in the criminal justice system is the most troubling aspect of penal 
policies and the prison system. Roma are over-represented both in statistics 
about prosecution and within the prison population’ (Gounev, 2013: 219). 
   Poland started its attempts at penal reform during the course of the 1990s, 
alongside other East European countries (King, 1996). Before, as Platek (2013) 
puts it, it was difficult to distinguish were prison ended, as most people, 
wherever they happened to be, felt as if they were behind bars. Reform 
introduced in 1997 stipulated that custody be used as a last resort. However, 
‘accustomed to harsh, long punishments, we have trouble changing our 
perspective’ (ibid: 185). In other words, prison in Poland is regarded as ‘the’ 
punishment, and despite the possibility of applying fines or probation, 
imprisonment remains the core provision. Suspended sentences, on the other 
hand, prove ineffective because they are not accompanied by rehabilitative 
programmes in the community.  
   There is a high percentage (25 per cent) of remand prisoners in Polish 
institutions, a fact regarded by the European Court of Human Rights as a national 
structural problem. Prisons are over-crowded, detaining twice the number of 
inmates they should legally hold, and educational or rehabilitative activities can 
hardly have an impact in such conditions. While in the past inmates worked and 
made a contribution to state finances, after the transition work was replaced by 
‘programmes’, supposedly aimed at helping prisoners reintegrate into society. 
Work in houses for the elderly or with children with special needs, work in 
agriculture and industry are all available on paper. Moreover, programmes for 
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the rehabilitation of alcoholics, drug abusers and sex offenders are also in place. 
But ‘very few are able to benefit from this rich offer’ (ibid: 190). 
   Around 5,000 people are imprisoned in Poland for drunken driving, most of 
whom are repeat offenders. Between 5-7,000 are sentenced to custody for 
possession of prohibited substances. Prisoners are young and poorly educated, 
devoid of realistic prospects for employment, and around half have committed 
property crimes: ‘they are the unwanted labour surplus in today’s market 
economy’ (ibid: 194). Prisoners serving a sentence for violent offences are about 
ten per cent, very few for domestic violence, which is perceived as a family issue. 
About 2,500 inmates are serving a prison sentence for not paying alimony to 
their divorcees, while foreigners and ethnic minorities only constitute 2 per cent 
of the prison population. ‘This is not because of Polish tolerance, it is rather 
because there are not many foreigners in Poland’ (ibid: 194). While 80,000 are 
incarcerated, over 30,000 of those sentenced to custody are not behind bars 
because they await a place to become vacant before serving their sentence. 
   The Russian Federation spent the last decade and a half discussing and probing 
penal reform measures, but political difficulties made their implementation 
patchy and problematic (MacAuley and Macdonald, 2007). In 2010, when the 
remaining pieces of the Gulag system were dismantled, proposals for change 
aimed at the abolition of labour colonies, the ranking of penal institutions in 
terms of security and the creation of a single-cell system (Piacentini, 2013). 
Surveillance technology was seen as paramount, along with the introduction of 
non-custodial measures, the development of a probation service and, in general, 
a new emphasis on rehabilitation. Aggregate figures show a decline in the total 
prison population since 2001, particularly for juveniles, and a marked increase of 
women in custody. On paper, alternatives offer day release, open institutions and 
programmes involving local communities, although external entities engaged in 
such programmes are mainly religious groups (Pallot and Piacentini, 2012). 
Custody, in brief, remains the core of the penal system in the Russian Federation, 
while post-custodial measures are being developed, including anger-
management programmes and projects revolving around cognitive behavioral 
therapy. With some key figures in the Prison Service publicly supporting Europe-
style changes, ‘the hoped-for end to the Gulag might just be happening, albeit 
slowly’ (Piacentini, 2013: 170). 
   Violent crime increased significantly during the last decade, particularly racist 
aggression, leading to condemnation by human rights organisations. According 
to the UN, lack of integration and cohesion in the Russian society creates 
growing marginalization and poverty, with migrants becoming scapegoats. While 
corruption in the country is rife, affecting all layers of society, and powerful 
forms of organized and white-collar crime mesh within the institutional 
apparatus (Rawlinson, 2012), the prison population is mainly composed by 
young marginalized offenders. Reacting with outrage to criticism from abroad, 
Russia remains faithful to its past, namely mass incarceration: ‘Russia will 
continue to face urgent questions on how prisons have yet again become tangled 
in a complex and authoritarian political web’ (Piacentini, 2013: 179). 




The prison system in Italy is fostered by a succession of emergencies associated 
with specific groups of offenders. Such groups are the target of ad hoc pieces of 
legislation or judicial and executive policies, and demand for their punishment 
becomes high at particular historical moments (Ruggiero, 1995). In Italy, armed 
robbers, violent political opponents, drug traffickers, organized crime members 
and migrants have acted as successive emergencies. Prison trends are reflected 
in this succession of social and institutional alarms alimented by real or 
imaginary panics, with amnesties used as responses to periodical overcrowding. 
By the late 1990s the justice system experienced a definitive bifurcation, 
becoming tolerant with the rich and powerful, and powerful and harsh with the 
poor. Migrants and drug users became the chosen victims of law and order 
campaigns, while the variable ‘safety’ determined who won the elections. 
Albanians, North Africans, Roma, Romanians, squeegee merchants, the homeless 
and drug users filled the prisons quickly: ‘This changed the Italian penal law to 
the point that it was no longer facts and offences, but lifestyles and life stories, 
which were penalized’ (Gonnella, 2013: 231). Migrants were harshly targeted 
simply for being illegally present on the Italian territory. 
   Italian penal institutions are characterized by four distinctive traits. First, the 
number of non-nationals held in custody (25-30%); second, the number of 
remand prisoners (almost 40%); third, the number of inmates sentenced for 
drug-related offences (35%); fourth, the rate of overcrowding (for each 100 
prison places officially available, there are 148 prisoners). A look at he social 
composition of those processed through the penal system reveals a high degree 
of selectivity. Custody, for remand or sentenced prisoners, mainly targets the 
socially and economically disadvantaged. Rules around recidivism, on the other 
hand, create a situation whereby the same individuals keep entering and exiting 
the prison system. Another indicator of selectivity is provided by the level of 
education of those incarcerated: only one per cent hold a university degree, 
while the number of illiterate prisoners is four times higher, and the large 
majority have only completed primary school. 
   Alternatives to custody are available and can be applied at any moment of the 
criminal justice process (Palma, 1997). Some completely divert offenders from 
the prison system, while others apply to offenders who are already serving a 
sentence. Amnesties, reform on paper, and emergencies suspending reform, 
aptly describe the vagaries of the penal system in Italy (Gonnella and Marietti, 
2010). The general climate prevailing in the country affects the number of 
individuals punished and the nature of the punishment inflicted. ‘This, however, 
does not seem to affect the corrupt elite ruling the country, whose criminality 
reproduces itself irrespective of the general climate oscillating between 
harshness and leniency’ (Gonnella, 2013: 243). 
   In Spain, after the death of Francisco Franco in 1975, the need and urgency to 
reform the penal system was intensely felt, but the process of change was met 
with hard opposition expressed by those social, economic and military forces 
that fought for a return to the past (Aranda Ocaña and Rivera Beiras, 2013). The 
Spanish Constitution was promulgated in 1978 and a set of principles was 
established guiding the criminal justice and the penal systems. These affirmed 
the need for sentencing proportionality, the abolition of capital punishment and 
torture and the rehabilitative purpose of custody. Despite the new openings, 
harsh punitive measures remained in place as a result of growing public alarm 
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addressed to specific groups of offenders, making the reform process uncertain 
and contradictory. For instance, the old Penal Code, which stood in opposition to 
the new constitutional principles, was only repealed in 1995. This was also the 
year when the a new Penal Code was ratified, introducing community work as an 
alternative to custody and probation for prisoners willing to undertake cultural, 
educational and work activities. At the same time, however, more severe 
treatment was addressed to offenders deemed particularly dangerous and the 
maximum sentence was extended to thirty years. 
   A culture of emergency spread in the penal system leading to what is termed 
the counter-reform of 2003. This brought the level of the maximum penalty to 40 
years imprisonment, curtailed alternatives to custody for certain categories of 
offenders, extended remand periods, and ruled the deportation of non-national 
offenders. This punitive drift gathered momentum when crime rates were falling, 
and mainly addressed property and drug offenders. Non-nationals in Spanish 
institutions are around 30% of the total prison population, and conditions for all 
are such that inmates are unable to benefit from any educational or 
rehabilitative programme. Institutions are crammed and cells are shared. The 
European Court of Human Rights regularly denounces this situation, equating it 
to inhuman and degrading treatment. Health conditions are dismal, with 
diseases spreading due to a lack of professional care. What is more disturbing is 
that harshness in the treatment of offenders goes hand in hand with the 
economic crisis causing harsher social problems. 
   Greek penal policies seem to be informed by improvisation and inconsistency 
(Karydis and Koulouris, 2013). This is what emerges when two key reports 
submitted to the parliament, respectively in 1994 and 2011, are examined. The 
1994 report (adopted four years later) stressed the ineffectiveness of 
imprisonment as a correctional tool, remarked the arbitrariness of the criminal 
justice system as a whole, and questioned its rehabilitative function. Prison 
regimes were said to violate elementary human rights and social forms of 
prevention were encouraged. Critics, however, felt that the report failed to 
‘consider the structural economic and social inequalities that make prisons 
continue to detain those whom penal institutions have always confined, namely 
the poor and dispossessed’ (ibid: 266).  
   The 2011 report provided a list of problems afflicting the Greek prison system, 
highlighting: over-crowding, the presence of non-national inmates, the 
prevalence of drug offenders, and widespread corruption within the institutions. 
The report encouraged the consideration of imprisonment as a last resort and 
the respect of prisoners’ rights and dignity, while work and education were 
indicated as the key rehabilitative tools. The development of alternatives to 
custody, including community service, home detention and electronic 
monitoring, were also proposed. In a contradictory fashion, however, while a 
process of decarceration was apparently advocated in the report, the number of 
new facilities whose construction was planned exceeded the number of old 
institutions to be dismantled.  
   Greece occupies the middle of the punitive ladder among European countries, 
although the prison population has quadrupled over the last thirty years 
(Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2011). Harsher sentences are the key factor for this, 
particularly with regard to drug offences, while remand prisoners form almost a 
third of the total prison population. Irregular migrants ‘awaiting deportation 
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after serving a sentence constitute an additional burden for the prison 
administration’ (Karydis and Koulouris, 2013: 274). This is a relatively recent 
development, bringing the current proportion of non-nationals in Greek prisons 
to around fifty per cent of the total prison population. While the economic crisis 
and the subsequent austerity measures are poised to cause more unemployment, 
poverty and exclusion, the international climate encourages both authoritarian 
and liberal penal policies. In this way, zero tolerance, mass incarceration and 
degrading conditions in custody coexist with efforts to develop and improve 
alternatives to custody and humane conditions in prison. ‘Penal policies in 
Greece reflect this contradictory international climate, favoring more use of 
imprisonment and further restrictions on inmates’ fundamental rights – while 
claiming the exact opposite’ (ibid: 283). 
 
Cultures of punishment 
 
The sketches presented above seem to corroborate the initial statement that 
prisons in Europe should be renamed as houses for the poor. In what follows an 
attempt is made to identify the philosophies inspiring these ‘houses’ and their 
latent functions. 
   In the countries considered there are some uniform modalities in the treatment 
of migrants, non-nationals, ethnic minorities, young and marginalized people. 
The harsher punishments inflicted on these groups reveal a process of penal 
differentiation which has been occurring for decades in most developed 
countries. Similar uniformity, however, is found in the lack of penal responses 
against crimes committed by relatively powerful individuals and groups. Such 
commonalities need some qualifications. 
   It has become by now a common practice to punish individuals who belong to 
specific groups because of an actuarial calculus indicating them as more likely to 
offend and re-offend. What is penalised, in most circumstances, is not their actual 
illegitimate conduct, but their social condition that is deemed conducive to 
crime. In contexts in which the labour market offers scarce opportunities to 
migrants and excluded people in general, penalties may be heavier due to the 
low expectations relating to their current and future participation in the 
productive process. In such cases, it is their ‘indolence’ and lack of participation 
in consumers’ markets that are punished, inactivity being perceived as a pre-
requisite for the adoption of unpredictable conducts, and punishment being 
deemed an appropriate measure for the exclusion of people from an already 
crowded labour market. This preventative punishment, in brief, is not aimed at 
preventing crime, but law-abiding behaviour which would come with work. We 
can assume, by contrast, that in countries where peripheral areas of employment 
are still available, punishment, whether more lenient or otherwise, will take on 
an ‘educational’ function, training the punished to accept peripheral, badly paid 
jobs (Ruggiero, 2010; 2013). 
   Trust is a key variable adopted by Mathiesen (2013) to explicate variations in 
punishment and its intensity. Trusting one’s social system means believing that 
everybody can find a place in it, even those who happen to flout its norms and 
challenge its values. Punishment, therefore, signals lack of confidence in social 
arrangements and, conversely, excessive confidence in authorities inflicting it. 
This excessive confidence in the elite takes the form of leniency for powerful 
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offenders, who paradoxically continue to be trusted even when committing 
crimes. Trust, however, is also dependent on media power, moral enterprise and 
anxiety brooding, all elements which end up drawing league tables of 
dangerousness, designating untrustworthy groups and individuals. In most 
counties examined above, anxiety associated with economic, political and 
‘spiritual’ difficulties is translated into fear of the other, and the other, whether 
actually dangerous or not, is subjected to differentiated penal treatment.  
   This socio-cultural dynamic is questioned by authors who argue that ‘changing 
patterns of punishment lie not in social processes but in state and legal 
processes’ (Garland, 2013: 484). The immediate causes of expanding prison 
populations and increased punitive measures, in this view, are to be found in 
specific forms of state action. In brief, legal enactments are deemed crucial for 
variations in penal outcomes. The leniency shown in the past by the Dutch penal 
system, for example, can be seen as the result of specific acts performed by state 
agents and of the professional ideology inspiring them (Downes, 1988). 
Prosecutors and judges held negative views about imprisonment: ‘an orientation 
shaped by their law school education, by their ongoing connections to 
criminological experts, and by the historical memory of internment under the 
Nazis’ (Garland, 2013: 493).  The question remains, however, what type of 
society the acts performed by state agents are expected to preserve or what type 
of social characteristics they aim to reproduce. Inequality, in this respect, is a key 
characteristic of social systems that can be included in the analysis of penal 
practices. Let us see how. 
   State acts performed in societies displaying a large degree of inequality have to 
be particularly energetic if that degree of inequality has to be maintained 
(Piketty, 2014; Rosanvallon, 2014). If penal measures are tools for the 
perpetuation of the status quo, in other words, more inequality must be turned 
into harsher penality. This entails an ideological process whereby growing 
inequality is met with passive consent or even with inoffensive anger ‘about so 
much wealth going to so few’ (Starr, 2014: 33). Penality, in such cases, aims at 
making widening economic disparities acceptable and, at the same time, 
reshaping the very idea of social justice, so that success is highly rewarded and 
failure heavily penalized. Penality, in brief, has to prevent the dispossessed from 
thinking of their situation in a collective way, while averting the type of 
‘reformism of fear’ generated by dissent, when governments realize that change 
is necessary in order to avoid unmanageable conflict. Penal variations, in this 
sense, are determined less by different socio-economic arrangements (Cavadino 
and Dignan, 2006) than by degrees of inequality.  
   A related issue pertains to the costs of punishment in situations of budgetary 
pressure (Lacey, 2008; McBride, 2013). The financial crash, for instance, may be 
seen as a lesson teaching us about the costs of unregulated excess, and 
simultaneously may offer an opportunity to think anew about excessive 
punishment. Penal moderation might therefore be advocated as a supplement to 
financial moderation and reform (Loader, 2010). Reform campaigners basing 
their arguments on the necessity to reduce penal expenditure appear to neglect 
that the elite to which they address their demands embrace a system of waste, 
where wealth is squandered, dilapidated and the elite itself is prone to destroy 
what it creates.  This practice, as Bataille (1967) would remark, is a 
characteristic of ruling groups disingenuously displaying a lack of interest in 
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their riches while reproducing the conditions to acquire growing quantities of 
them. ‘Waste’ is a good investment if it sustains a penal system that defends 
privileges, and cannot be measured with the conventional rational calculus 
applied in common mathematical operations. The ‘costs’ of penal systems, as 
argued above, have to be measured through the degree of income differences 
they are supposed to maintain or exacerbate.  
   A final thought should be given to the function of punishment when the targets, 
as in the countries examined, are mainly marginalized, excluded groups. The 
process of incarceration, with its arbitrariness and differential punitiveness, 
reproduces the illegal choice presumably embraced by prisoners, thus creating 
an intelligible cultural continuity between the realm of crime and that of 
punishment. Prisons, in brief, perpetuate the cognitive structure of offenders 
prior to imprisonment, who are then more likely to re-offend after being 
released (Hockey, 2012). Moreover, penal action against vulnerable groups does 
not generate integration or social stability, let alone produce law-abiding 
citizens. Mass incarceration of the poor causes yet more marginalisation, 
exclusion, community disorganization, it produces criminogenic effects (De 
Giorgi, 2013), destabilizing and tearing apart the very social fabric that it 
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